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A visual cryptography scheme for a set P of n participants is a
method of encoding a secret image SI into n shadow images called
shares, where each participant in P receives one share. Certain
qualified subsets of participants can ‘‘visually’’ recover the secret
image, but other, forbidden, sets of participants have no information (in
an information-theoretic sense) on SI. A ‘‘visual’’ recovery for a set
XP consists of xeroxing the shares given to the participants in X onto
transparencies, and then stacking them. The participants in a qualified
set X will be able to see the secret image without any knowledge of
cryptography and without performing any cryptographic computation.
In this paper we propose two techniques for constructing visual crypto-
graphy schemes for general access structures. We analyze the structure
of visual cryptography schemes and we prove bounds on the size of
the shares distributed to the participants in the scheme. We provide a
novel technique for realizing k out of n threshold visual cryptography
schemes. Our construction for k out of n visual cryptography schemes
is better with respect to pixel expansion than the one proposed by
M. Naor and A. Shamir (Visual cryptography, in ‘‘Advances in Cryp-
tologyEurocrypt ’94’’ CA. De Santis, Ed.), Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science, Vol. 950, pp. 112, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1995) and
for the case of 2 out of n is the best possible. Finally, we consider
graph-based access structures, i.e., access structures in which any
qualified set of participants contains at least an edge of a given graph
whose vertices represent the participants of the scheme. ] 1996
Academic Press, Inc.
1. INTRODUCTION
A visual cryptography scheme for a set P of n participants
is a method of encoding a secret image SI into n shadow
images called shares, where each participant in P receives
one share. Certain qualified subsets of participants can
‘‘visually’’ recover the secret image, but other, forbidden,
sets of participants have no information (in an information-
theoretic sense) on SI. A ‘‘visual’’ recovery for a set XP
consists of xeroxing the shares given to the participants in X
onto transparencies, and then stacking them. The par-
ticipants in a qualified set X will be able to see the secret
image without any knowledge of cryptography and without
performing any cryptographic computation.
The best way to understand visual cryptography is by
resorting to an example. Suppose that there are four par-
ticipants, that is P=[1, 2, 3, 4], and that the qualified sets
are all subsets of P containing at least one of the three
sets [1, 2], [2, 3], or [3, 4]. Hence, the family of qualified
sets is
1Qual=[[1, 2], [2, 3], [3, 4], [1, 2, 3], [1, 2, 4],
[1, 3, 4], [2, 3, 4], [1, 2, 3, 4]].
We will stipulate that all remaining subsets of P are
forbidden.
We want to encode the secret image ‘‘IC’’. The four shares
generated by a visual cryptography scheme for 1Qual are
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given in the Appendix. They look like random patterns and,
indeed, no individual share provides any information, even
to an infinitely powerful computer, on the original image.
To decrypt the secret image the reader should xerox each
pattern on a separate transparency, stack together the
transparencies associated to participants in any qualified
set, and project the result with an overhead projector. If the
transparencies are aligned carefully, then the reader will get
the images shown in the remaining part of the Appendix.
This new cryptographic paradigm has been recently
introduced by Naor and Shamir [11]. They analyzed the
case of a k out of n threshold visual cryptography scheme,
in which the secret image is visible if and only if any k trans-
parencies are stacked together.
A possible application, mentioned in [11], is the follow-
ing. The 2 out of 2 visual cryptography scheme can be
thought of as a private key cryptosystem. We encode the
secret printed message into two random looking shares.
One of the two shares will be a printed page of ciphertext
which can be sent by mail or fax, whereas the other share
serves as the secret key. The original image is revealed by
stacking together the two transparencies. This system is
similar to the one-time pad, as each page of ciphertext is
decoded by using a different transparency. However, it does
not require any cryptographic computationthe decoding
is done by the human visual system.
Visual cryptography schemes with extended capabilities
have been analyzed in [3]. The authors present a general
technique for implementing extended visual cryptography
schemes which uses hypergraph colorings.
In this paper we extend Naor and Shamir’s model to
general access structures, where an access structure is a
specification of all qualified and forbidden subsets of par-
ticipants. We propose two different techniques to construct
visual cryptography schemes for any access structure. We
analyze the structure of visual cryptography schemes and
we prove bounds on the size of the shares distributed to the
participants in the scheme. We provide a novel technique to
realize k out of n threshold visual cryptography schemes.
Our construction for k out of n visual cryptography schemes
is better with respect to pixel expansion than the one
proposed in [11] and for the case of 2 out of n is the best
possible. Our construction for 2 out of n schemes has pixel
expansion of only about log n (see Theorem 7.3) while the
scheme proposed in [11] has pixel expansion of n. Also, we
consider graph-based access structures, i.e., access struc-
tures in which any qualified set of participants contains at
least one edge of a given graph whose vertices represent the
participants of the scheme.
2. THE MODEL
Let P=[1, ..., n] be a set of elements called participants,
and let 2P denote the set of all subsets of P. Let 1Qual2P
and 1Forb2P, where 1Qual & 1Forb=<. We refer to mem-
bers of 1Qual as qualified sets and we call members of 1Forb
forbidden sets. The pair (1Qual, 1Forb) is called the access
structure of the scheme.
Define 10 to consist of all the minimal qualified sets:
10=[A # 1Qual : A$  1Qual for all A$/A].
A participant P # P is an essential participant if there exists
a set XP such that X _ [P] # 1Qual but X  1Qual . If a
participant P is not essential then we can construct a visual
cryptography scheme giving him a share completely ‘‘white’’
or even nothing as his share. In fact, a non-essential partici-
pant does not need to participate ‘‘actively’’ in the
reconstruction of the image, since the information he has is
not needed by any set in P in order to recover the shared
image. In any VCS having non-essential participants, these
participants do not require any information in their shares.
Therefore, unless otherwise specified, we assume through-
out this paper that all participants are essential.
In the case where 1Qual is monotone increasing, 1Forb is
monotone decreasing, and 1Qual _ 1Forb=2P, the access
structure is said to be strong, and 10 is termed a basis. (This
situation is the usual setting for traditional secret sharing.)
In a strong access structure,
1Qual=[CP: BC for some B # 10],
and we say that 1Qual is the closure of 10 .
For sets X and Y and for elements x and y, to avoid over-
burdening the notation, we often will write x for [x], xy for
[x, y], xY for [x] _ Y, and XY for X _ Y.
We assume that the message consists of a collection of
black and white pixels. Each pixel appears in n versions
called shares, one for each transparency. Each share is a
collection of m black and white subpixels. The resulting
structure can be described by an n_m Boolean matrix
S=[sij] where sij=1 iff the j th subpixel in the ith trans-
parency is black. Therefore the grey level of the combined
share, obtained by stacking the transparencies i1 , ..., is , is
proportional to the Hamming weight w(V) of the m-vector
V=OR(ri 1 , ..., ris) where ri1 , ..., ri s are the rows of S
associated with the transparencies we stack. This grey level
is interpreted by the visual system of the users as black or as
white in according with some rule of contrast.
Definition 2.1. Let (1Qual , 1Forb) be an access struc-
ture on a set of n participants. Two collections (multisets) of
n_m boolean matrices C0 and C1 constitute a visual cryp-
tography scheme (1Qual , 1Forb , m)-VCS if there exist the
value :(m) and the set [(X, tX)]X # 1 Qual satisfying:
1. Any (qualified) set X=[i1 , i2 , ..., ip] # 1Qual can
recover the shared image by stacking their transparencies.
Formally, for any M # C0 , the ‘‘or’’ V of rows i1 , i2 , ..., ip
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satisfies w(V)tX&:(m) } m; whereas, for any M # C1 it
results that w(V)tX .
2. Any (forbidden) set X=[i1 , i2 , ..., ip] # 1Forb has no
information on the shared image. Formally, the two collec-
tions of p_m matrices Dt , with t # [0, 1], obtained by
restricting each n_m matrix in Ct to rows i1 , i2 , ..., ip are
indistinguishable in the sense that they contain the same
matrices with the same frequencies.
Each pixel of the original image will be encoded into n
pixels, each of which consists of m subpixels. To share a
white (black, resp.) pixel, we randomly choose one of the
matrices in C0 (C1 , resp.), and distribute row i to participant
i. The chosen matrix defines the m subpixels in each of the
n transparencies. Notice that in the previous definition C0
(C1) is a multiset of n_m boolean matrices, therefore we
allow a matrix to appear more than once in C0 (C1). Finally,
observe that the sizes of the collections C0 and C1 do not
need to be the same.
The first property is related to the contrast of the image.
It states that when a qualified set of users stack their
transparencies they can correctly recover the shared image.
The value :(m) is called relative difference, the number
:(m) } m is referred to as the contrast of the image, the set
[(X, tX)]X # 1Qual is called the set of thresholds, and tX is the
threshold associated with X # 1Qual . We want the contrast
to be as large as possible and at least one, that is,
:(m)1m. The second property is called security, since it
implies that, even by inspecting all their shares, a forbidden
set of participants cannot gain any information useful in
deciding whether the shared pixel was white or black.
There are few differences between the model of visual
cryptography we propose and the one presented by Naor
and Shamir [11]. Our model is a generalization of the one
proposed in [11], since with each set X # 1Qual we associate
a (possibly) different threshold tX . Further, the access struc-
ture is not required to be strong in our model.
Notice that if a set of participants X is a superset of a
qualified set X$, then they can recover the shared image by
considering only the shares of the set X$. This does not in
itself rule out the possibility that stacking all the transparen-
cies of the participants in X does not reveal any information
about the shared image.
We make a couple of observations about the structure of
1Qual and 1Forb in light of the above definition. First, it is
clear that any subset of a forbidden subset is forbidden, so
1Forb is necessarily monotone decreasing. Second, it is also
easy to see that no superset of a qualified subset is forbidden.
Hence, a strong access structure is simply one in which 1Qual
is monotone increasing and 1Qual _ 1Forb=2P.
Notice also that, given an (admissible) access structure
(1Qual , 1Forb), we can ‘‘embed’’ it in a strong access structure
(1 $Qual , 1 $Forb) in which 1Qual1 $Qual and 1Forb1 $Forb .
One way to do this is to take (1 $Qual , 1 $Forb) to be the strong
access structure having as basis 10 , where 10 consists of the
minimal sets in 1Qual .
In view of the above observations, it suffices to construct
VCS for strong access structures. However, we will some-
times give constructions for arbitrary access structures as
well.
2.1. The Size of the Collections C0 and C1
In this paper we consider only VCS in which the collec-
tions C0 and C1 have the same size, i.e., |C0 |=|C1 |=r.
Actually, this is not a restriction at all. Indeed, given an
access structure (1Qual , 1Forb), we will show how to obtain,
from an arbitrary VCS for (1Qual , 1Forb), a VCS having
the same parameters m, :(m), and [(X, tX)]X # 1Qual , with
equally sized C0 and C1 .
Let M be a matrix in the collection C0 _ C1 of a (1Qual ,
1Forb , m)-VCS on a set of participants P. For XP, let MX
denote the m-vector obtained by considering the or of the
rows corresponding to participants in X; whereas M[X]
denotes the |X |_m matrix obtained from M by considering
only the rows corresponding to participants in X.
Now, suppose that |C0 |=r0 and |C1 |=r1{r0 . Let
X # 1Forb and let M # C0 _ C1 . For i # [0, 1], let ’iX denote
the number of times that the matrix M[X] appears in the
collection [A[X]: A # Ci]. From Property 2 of Defini-
tion 2.1 we have that ’0X r0=’
1
Xr1 . We construct the collec-
tions C$0 and C$1 of a new (1Qual , 1Forb , m)-VCS, termed 7$,
by taking r1 copies of each matrix in C0 and r0 copies of
each matrix in C1 , respectively, obtaining |C$0 |=|C$1 |=
r=r0 } r1 .
We have to show that Properties 1 and 2 of Definition 2.1
are satisfied. Clearly, Property 1 of Definition 2.1 holds. Let
X # 1Forb and let M # C$0 _ C$1 . For i # [0, 1], let +iX denote
the number of times that the matrix M[X] appears in the
collection [A[X]: A # C$i]. It results that +0X=’
0
X } r1 and
+1X=’
1
X } r0 . Therefore,
+0X
r
=
’0X } r1
r0 } r1
=
’0X
r0
=
’1X
r1
=
’1X } r0
r1 } r0
=
+1X
r
.
Thus, Property 2 of Definition 2.1 is satisfied. It is worth-
while to notice that the relative difference :(m), the pixel
expansion m, and set of thresholds [(X, tX)]X # 1 Qual do not
change when we go from 7 to 7$. Hence, without loss of
generality, in this paper we restrict our attention to VCS in
which the collections C0 and C1 have the same size.
2.2. Basis Matrices
Most of the constructions in this paper are realized using
two n_m matrices, S0 and S 1, called basis matrices, which
satisfy the following definition.
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FIG. 1. Shares of a 2 out of 6 threshold VCS.
Definition 2.2. Let (1Qual , 1Forb) be an access struc-
ture on a set of n participants. A (1Qual , 1Forb , m)-VCS
with relative difference :(m) and set of thresholds
[(X, tX)]X # 1 Qual is realized using the two n_m basis
matrices S 0 and S1 if the following two conditions hold.
1. If X=[i1 , i2 , ..., ip] # 1Qual (i.e., if X is a qualified
set), then the or V of rows i1 , i2 , ..., ip of S 0 satisfies
w(V)tX&:(m) } m, whereas for S 1 it results that
w(V)tX .
2. If X=[i1 , i2 , ..., ip] # 1Forb (i.e., if X is a forbidden
set), then the two p_m matrices obtained by restricting S 0
and S1 to rows i1 , i2 , ..., ip are equal up to a column per-
mutation.
The collections C0 and C1 are obtained by permuting the
columns of the corresponding basis matrix (S0 for C0 , and
S1 for C1) in all possible ways. Note that, in this case, the
size of the collections C0 and C1 is the same (it is equal to m!)
and it is denoted by r. This technique has been introduced
in [11]. The algorithm for the VCS based on the previous
construction of the collections C0 and C1 has small memory
requirements (it keeps only the basis matrices S0 and S1)
and it is efficient (to choose a matrix in C0 (C1 , resp.) it only
generates a permutation of the columns of S0 (S 1, resp.)).
We give two examples to illustrate the definitions, the use
of basis matrices, and the way the subpixels are arranged.
Example 2.3. Suppose n=4, so P=[1, 2, 3, 4]. Define
1Qual=[[1, 2], [2, 3], [3, 4], [1, 2, 3]]
and
1Forb=[[1], [2], [3], [4], [1, 3], [1, 4], [2, 4]].
Then 10=[[1, 2], [2, 3], [3, 4]].
We will construct a (1Qual , 1Forb , 3)-VCS using basis
matrices. The basis matrices S0 and S 1 are as follows:
S0=_
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0& S1=_
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
0& .
In this scheme, :(m)=13, so the contrast is one. Let us first
look at the qualified subsets. It is easy to check that the
following values hold with regard to Property 1 of Defini-
tion 2.2:
t[1, 2]=3
t[2, 3]=2
t[3, 4]=3, and
t[1, 2, 3]=3.
Property 2 of Definition 2.2 is easily verified for the for-
bidden sets. Finally, the sets [1, 2, 4], [1, 3, 4], [2, 3, 4],
and [1, 2, 3, 4] are neither forbidden nor qualified, so the
scheme is not a scheme for a strong access structure.
Example 2.4. Suppose P=[1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6] and con-
sider the strong access structures with basis 10=[[i, j]:
i, j # P and i{j]. This access structure is based on the com-
plete graph with 6 vertices and it is equivalent to a 2 out of
6 threshold structure. The following basis matrices represent
a VCS for the strong access structure on the set of par-
ticipants P with basis 10 .
S0=_
1100
& S1=_
1010
& .
1100 1001
1100 1100
1100 0110
1100 0101
1100 0011
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In this scheme any pixel of the original image is encoded
into four subpixels. To do not distort the aspect ratio of the
original image it is convenient to arrange the subpixels in a
2_2 array where each share has the form depicted in Fig. 1.
These shares correspond to the rows of the basis matrices S 0
and S1, respectively. The subpixels are disposed in a clock-
wise fashion starting from the upper-left corner of the 2_2
array. Clearly, to any permutation of the columns of S0 and
S1 will correspond a new re-arrangement of the subpixels
into the 2_2 array.
In the previous example we have seen how to arrange the
subpixels forming a share in order to avoid the distortion of
the aspect ratio of the original image. Thus, the best results
are obtained when the pixel expansion m is a square. If this
is not the case, we can expand the shares by ‘‘padding’’ the
share with m$ white subpixels in such a way that m+m$ is
a square and then we can apply the technique seen in Exam-
ple 2.4. This construction works (see Lemma 5.3), but we
get a VCS with worse relative difference than the one we
started with. If m is not a square, then a second method of
realizing a VCS is to consider c copies of the share in such
a way that c } m is a square and then to apply the technique
seen in Example 2.4. A third construction is to let each sub-
pixel of the share to occupy one m th of a square surface. For
example, each subpixel can have a rectangular shape of
height 1 and of width 1m. This is the way the images of the
example given in the Appendix are obtained.
3. AN (n, n)-THRESHOLD SCHEME
A (k, n)-threshold VCS realizes the strong access struc-
ture with basis
10=[BP: |B|=k].
Thus, the original message is visible (that is, Property 1, of
Definition 2.1 is satisfied) if any k of n participants stack
their transparencies, but totally invisible (that is, Property
2 of Definition 2.1 is satisfied) if fewer than k transparencies
are stacked together or analysed by any other method. In
this section we recall some of the results presented in [11]
for (n, n)-threshold VCS. In such a scheme, the original
message is visible if and only if all n transparencies are
stacked together, but totally invisible if fewer than n trans-
parencies are stacked together or analysed by any other
method.
The construction of an (n, n)-threshold VCS is obtained
by means of the construction of the basis matrices S0 and S 1
defined as follows: S0 is the matrix whose columns are all
the boolean n-vectors having an even number of 1’s, and S 1
is the matrix whose columns are all the boolean n-vectors
having an odd number of 1’s.
Lemma 3.1 [11]. The above scheme is an (n, n)-thresh-
old VCS with parameters m=2n&1, :(m)=12n&1 and
r=2n&1!.
Example 3.2. Let n=4. Then the two basis matrices are
S0=_
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1&
S1=_
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
0& .
The scheme realized using the previous construction is
optimal with respect to the values of m and :(m), as stated
in the next theorem.
Theorem 3.3 [11]. In any (n, n)-threshold VCS,
:(m)12n&1 and m2n&1.
In general, we will be interested in minimizing m for a
given access structure. Hence, we define m*(1Qual , 1Forb) to
be the smallest value m such that an (1Qual , 1Forb , m)-VCS
exists.
Let (1Qual , 1Forb) be an access structure on a set P of
participants. Given a subset of participants P$P, we
define the access structure induced by P$ to be the families
of sets defined as follows:
1[P$]Qual=[X # 1Qual : XP$], and
1[P$]Forb=[X # 1Forb : XP$].
The following lemma is immediate.
Lemma 3.4. Let (1Qual , 1Forb) be an access structure on
a set P of participants, and let (1[P$]Qual , 1[P$]Forb) be
the induced access structure on the subset of participants P$.
Then m*(1[P$]Qual , 1[P$]Forb)m*(1Qual , 1Forb).
The next corollary is a consequence of Theorem 3.3 and
Lemma 3.4.
Corollary 3.5. Let (1Qual , 1Forb) be an access struc-
ture. Suppose that X # 10 , and suppose that Y # 1Forb for all
YX, Y{X. Then m*(1Qual , 1Forb)2|X|&1.
4. GENERAL CONSTRUCTIONS
In this section we will present two construction techni-
ques to realize visual cryptography schemes for any access
structure.
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4.1. A Construction for VCS Using Cumulative Arrays
The first construction we consider is based on the cumu-
lative array method introduced in [13]. Let (1Qual , 1Forb)
be a strong access structure on the set of participants
P=[1, 2, ..., n]. Let ZM denote the collection of the maxi-
mal forbidden sets of 1 :
ZM=[B # 1Forb : B _ [i] # 1Qual for all i # P"B].
A cumulative map (;, T ) for 1Qual is a finite set T along with
a mapping ;: P  2T such that for QP we have that
.
a # Q
;(a)=T  Q # 1Qual .
We can construct a cumulative map (;, T ) for any 1Qual
by using the collection of the maximal forbidden sets
ZM=[F1 , ..., Ft] as follows. Let T=[T1 , ..., Tt] and for
any i # P let
;(i)=[Tj | i  Fj , 1 jt]. (1)
It is easy to see that for any X # 1Qual we have
.
i # X
;(i)=T,
whereas any set X # 1Forb will be missing at least one Tj # T.
From the cumulative mapping (1) for 1Qual , we can
obtain a cumulative array for 1Qual , as follows. A cumulative
array is a |P|_|T | boolean matrix, denoted by CA, such
that CA(i, j )=1 if and only if i  Fj .
Example 4.1. Let P=[1, 2, 3, 4], 10=[[1, 2], [2, 3],
[3, 4]], ZM=[[1, 4], [1, 3], [2, 4]], and let F1=[1, 4],
F2=[1, 3], and F3=[2, 4]. Therefore, |T |=3. The cumu-
lative array for 1Qual is the following:
CA=_
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
0& .
At this point we can realize a visual cryptography scheme
for any strong access structure. Our technique is based on
the (n, n)-threshold VCS of Section 3. Let ZM be set of the
maximal forbidden sets and let t=|ZM |. Let CA be the
cumulative array for 1Qual obtained using the cumulative
map (1). Let S 0 and S 1 be the basis matrices for a (t, t)-
threshold VCS. The basis matrices S0 and S 1 for a VCS for
the access structure (1Qual , 1Forb) can be constructed as
follows. For any fixed i let ji, 1 , ..., ji, g i be the integers j such
that CA(i, j )=1. The i th row of S0 (S 1, resp.) consists of the
or of the rows ji, 1 , ..., ji, g i of S
0 (S 1, resp.). An example will
help to illustrate this technique.
Example 4.1 (Cont.). Let P=[1, 2, 3, 4], 10=[[1, 2],
[2, 3], [3, 4]], and ZM=[[1, 4], [1, 3], [2, 4]]. Hence,
|T |=3. Let S 0 and S 1 be
0 0 1 1
S 0=_0 1 0 1&0 1 1 0
1 1 0 0
S 1=_1 0 1 0& .1 0 0 1
The basis matrices S0 and S 1 in a VCS realizing the strong
access structure with basis 10 are
S0=_
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1&
S1=_
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
0& .
The second row of S0 is the or of rows 1 and 2 of S 0 ; that
is,
[0, 1, 1, 1]=[0, 1, 1, 0] or [0, 1, 0, 1],
and the third row of S 0 is the or of rows 1 and 3 of S 0. The
first and the fourth rows of S0 are equal to rows 3 and 2 of
S 0, respectively, and similarly for S 1.
The next theorem also holds.
Theorem 4.2. Let (1Qual , 1Forb) be a strong access
structure, and let ZM be the family of the maximal forbidden
sets in 1Forb . Then there exists a (1Qual , 1Forb , m)-VCS with
m=2|Z M |&1 and tX=m for any X # 1Qual .
4.2. Constructing VCS from Smaller Schemes
In this section we present a construction for visual cryp-
tography schemes using small schemes as building blocks in
the construction of larger schemes.
Let (1 $Qual , 1 $Forb) and (1"Qual , 1"Forb) be two access struc-
tures on a set of n participants P. If a participant i # P is
non-essential for (1 $Qual , 1 $Forb), we assume that i # 1 $Forb
and that i does not receive nothing as share. Analogously for
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(1"Qual , 1"Forb). Suppose there exist a (1 $Qual , 1 $Forb, m$)-
VCS and a (1"Qual , 1"Forb , m")-VCS with basis matrices
R0, R1 and T 0, T 1, respectively. We will show how to
construct a VCS for the access structure (1Qual , 1Forb)=
(1 $Qual _ 1"Qual , 1 $Forb & 1"Forb). From the matrices R0, R1,
T 0, and T 1 we construct two pairs of matrices, (R 0, R 1) and
(T 0, T 1), each consisting of n rows, as follows. Let us first
show how to construct R 0. For i=1, ..., n, the i th row of R 0
has all zeroes as entries if the participant i is not an essential
participant of (1 $Qual , 1 $Forb); otherwise, it is the row of R0
corresponding to participant i. The matrices R 1, T 0, and T 1
are constructed similarly. Finally, the basis matrices S 0
(S1, resp.) for (1Qual , 1Forb) will be realized by concatenat-
ing the matrices R 0 and T 0 (R 1 and T 1, resp.). (That
is, S0=R 0 b T 0$ and S1=R 1 b T 1, where b denotes the
operator ‘‘concatenation’’ of two matrices.) In Theorem 4.4
we will prove that the scheme obtained using this method
realizes a VCS. An example will help in illustrating the
previous technique.
Example 4.3. Let P=[1, 2, 3, 4, 5] and let 10=
[[1, 2], [2, 3], [3, 4], [4, 5], [1, 5], [2, 5]]. We can con-
struct a visual cryptography scheme for the strong access
structure (1Qual , 1Forb) having basis 10 by using VCS for
the strong access structures with bases 1$0=[[1, 2], [1, 5]]
and 1"0=[[2, 3], [3, 4], [4, 5], [2, 5]], respectively:
10 10
R0=_10& , R1=_01& and10 01
T0=_
10
10
10
10& , T1=_
10
01
10
01& .
From the above matrices we obtain the matrices R 0, R 1, T 0,
and T 1 :
10 10
10 01
R 0=_00& , R 1=_00& and00 00
10 01
00 00
10 10
T 0=_10& , T 1=_01& .10 10
10 01
Contactenating the matrix R 0 with T 0 and the matrix R 1
with T 1, we obtain the following basis matrices S 0 and S 1
for a visual cryptography scheme for the strong access struc-
ture with basis 10 :
1000 1000
1010 0110
S0=_0010& S1=_0001& .0010 0010
1010 0101
The next theorem holds.
Theorem 4.4. Let (1 $Qual , 1 $Forb) and (1"Qual , 1"Forb) be
two access structures on a set of n participants P. Sup-
pose there exist a (1 $Qual , 1 $Forb, m$)-VCS and a (1"Qual ,
1"Forb, m")-VCS with basis matrices R0, R1 and T 0, T 1,
respectively. Then the previous construction yields a (1 $Qual _
1"Qual , 1 $Forb & 1"Forb, m$+m")-VCS. If the original access
structures are both strong, then so is the resulting access
structure.
Proof. Let m=m$+m". Let [(X, t$X)]X # 1$Qual and
[(X, t"X)]X # 1"Qual be the sets of thresholds satisfying Defini-
tion 2.2 for the access structures (1 $Qual , 1 $Forb) and
(1"Qual , 1"Forb), respectively. Finally, let :$(m$) and :"(m")
be the relative differences of the two VCSs. Define :(m) to
be
:(m)=
min[:$(m$) } m$, :"(m") } m"]
m
.
We have to show that the matrices S0 and S1, constructed
using the previously described technique, are basis matrices
for the access structure (1Qual , 1Forb)=(1 $Qual _ 1"Qual ,
1 $Forb & 1"Forb).
Let X be a subset of participants. First, suppose that
X # 1 $Qual & 1"Qual and let tX=t$X+t"X . It results that
w(S 0X)=w(R
0
X b T
0
X)
=w(R 0X)+w(T
0
X)
=w(R0X)+w(T
0
X)
t$X&:$(m$) } m$+t"X&:"(m") } m"
tX&:(m) } m,
whereas
w(S 1X)=w(R
1
X b T
1
X)
=w(R 1X)+w(T
1
X)
t$X+t"X
=tX .
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If X # 1 $Qual"1"Qual , then let tX=t$X+w(T 0X). It results that
w(S 0X)=w(R
0
X b T
0
X)
=w(R 0X)+w(T
0
X)
t$X&:$(m$) } m$+w(T 0X)
t$X&:(m) } m+w(T 0X)
=tX&:(m) } m,
whereas
w(S 1X)=w(R
1
X b T
1
X)
=w(R 1X)+w(T
1
X)
t$X+w(T 1X)
=t$X+w(T 0X)
=tX .
If X # 1"Qual"1 $Qual , then let tX=t"X+w(R 0X). We can prove
that w(S 0X)tX&:(m) } m and w(S
1
X)tX . Using the
reasoning applied to the previous case, Property 1. of
Definition 2.2 is satisfied.
Now, suppose that X # 1 $Forb & 1"Forb. We have to show
that S0[X]=S 1[X] up to a column permutation. We have
that
S0[X]=R 0[X] b T 0[X]
=R 1[X] b T 1[X]
=S1[X],
where the second equality is satisfied up to a column per-
mutation. Hence, Property 2 of Definition 2.2 is satisfied,
too. It is easy to see that if the original access structures are
strong, then so is the resulting access structure. Therefore,
the theorem holds. K
The construction technique employed in the proof of
Theorem 4.4 does not work for general VCS (i.e., if they are
not constructed from basis matrices). That is, given a
(1 $Qual , 1 $Forb, m$)-VCS and a (1"Qual , 1"Forb, m")-VCS the
‘‘concatenation’’ of the matrices of the two schemes does not
give rise to a (1 $Qual _ 1"Qual , 1 $Forb & 1"Forb, m$+m")-VCS.
Indeed, consider the collections C0 and C1 of a possible (2,
2) threshold VCS, denoted by 7, obtained as follows. The
collection C0 is realized considering the matrices obtained
by permuting the columns of the matrices
_100010& _
110
110&
whereas the collection C1 is obtained by considering the
matrices obtained by permuting the columns of the matrices
_100011& _
110
001& .
Suppose that we use 7 to realize VCSs for the strong access
structures having bases [[1, 2]] and [[2, 3]]. To con-
struct the collections C0 and C1 of a VCS for the strong
access structure having basis [[1, 2], [2, 3]] we cannot
just ‘‘concatenate’’ the matrices of the two schemes. Indeed,
it is easy to see that
110000
M=_110110& # C0 and000110
110000
M$=_001100& # C1 .000011
Hence, we get w(M[1, 2])=w(M$[1, 2])=4 contradicting
Property 1 of Definition 2.1. Therefore, the construction
technique employed in the proof of Theorem 4.4 does not
work for general VCSs.
It is not difficult to see that given a (1 $Qual , 1 $Forb, m$)-
VCS and a (1"Qual , 1"Forb , m")-VCS the ‘‘concatenation’’
of all matrices of the two schemes gives rise to a (1 $Qual _
1"Qual , 1 $Forb & 1"Forb, m$+m")-VCS if and only if for all
X # 1 $Qual _ 1"Qual the following condition is satisfied:
min
M # C$1
w(M X)+ min
M # C"1
w(M X)> max
M # C$0
w(M X)+ max
M # C"0
w(M X).
Recall that, for M # C0 _ C1 , M is the matrix in which the i th
row has all zeroes as entries if the participant i is not an
essential participant; otherwise, it is the row of M corre-
sponding to participant i, as defined at the beginning of
Section 4.2. The previous condition states that for any
X # 1 $Qual _ 1"Qual and for any M # C1 and M$ # C0 it results
that w(MX)>w(M$X). Therefore, there will be always a
difference between a white and a black pixel. That is, the
relative difference will be positive. More precisely, let m=
m$+m" and let
Wmin(X )= min
M # C$1
w(M X )+ min
M # C"1
w(M X)
and
Wmax(X )= max
M # C$0
w(M X)+ max
M # C"0
w(M X ).
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The contrast :(m) is equal to
:(m)= min
X # 1 $Qual _ 1"Qual
Wmin(X )&Wmax(X )
m
.
The next corollary is an immediate consequence of
Theorem 4.4.
Corollary 4.5. Let (1Qual , 1Forb) be an access struc-
ture. If 1Qual=qi=1 1(i, Qual ) , 1Forb=
q
i=1 1(i, Forb ) , and,
for i=1, ..., q, there exists a (1(i, Qual ) , 1(i, Forb ) , mi )-VCS
constructed using basis matrices, then there exists a
(1Qual , 1Forb , m)-VCS constructed using basis matrices,
where m=qi=1 mi . If the q original access structures are
strong then so is the resulting access structure.
From Lemma 3.1 and Corollary 4.5 the following
theorem holds.
Theorem 4.6. Let (1Qual , 1Forb) be a strong access
structure having basis 10 . There exists a (1Qual , 1Forb , m)-
VCS where m=X # 1 0 2
|X |&1.
The previous theorem states a general result on the exist-
ence of VCS for any strong access structure. For special
classes of access structures it is possible to achieve a
smaller value of m, as we will show in Section 6 for threshold
access structures, and in Section 7 for graph-based access
structures.
5. ON THE STRUCTURE OF VCS
In this section we provide some useful properties of VCS.
First, we investigate the case of ‘‘isolated’’ participants.
Then, we show how to construct VCS for any non-con-
nected access structure using VCS for its connected parts.
Finally, we prove that any matrix M in the collection
C0 _ C1 has to contain some predefined submatrices, which
we call ‘‘unavoidable patterns.’’
5.1 Isolated Participants
In this section we show that we do not need to consider
access structures containing ‘‘isolated’’ participants; i.e., we
can suppose that |X |2 for any X # 1Qual .
This is shown as follows. Suppose that (1Qual , 1Forb) is an
access structure on participant set P, and suppose that
x  P. Let C0 and C1 be the collections of matrices in a
(1Qual , 1Forb, m)-VCS.
First, we show how to construct a VCS for the access
structure (1Qual _ [[x]], 1Forb).
Lemma 5.1. Let (1Qual , 1Forb) be an access structure on
a set of participants P, and let x  P. If there exists a
(1Qual , 1Forb , m)-VCS, then there exists a (1Qual _ [[x]],
1Forb , m)-VCS.
Proof. Let C0 and C1 be the collections of matrices in a
(1Qual , 1Forb , m)-VCS. Then, for any M # C0 , adjoin a new
row (for participant x) consisting entirely of 0’s. Similarly,
for any M$ # C1 , adjoin a new row (for participant x) con-
sisting entirely of 1’s. K
Of course, Lemma 5.1 can be applied as many times as
desired, if there is more than one isolated participant.
We now give a modification of Lemma 5.1 which shows
how to construct a VCS in which every subset of par-
ticipants containing x is qualified.
Lemma 5.2. Let (1Qual , 1Forb) be an access structure on
a set of participants P, and let x  P. If there exists a
(1Qual , 1Forb , m)-VCS, then there exists a (1$Qual , 1Forb ,
m+1)-VCS where
1 $Qual=1Qual _ [X _ [x]: XP].
Proof. Let C0 and C1 be the collections of matrices in a
(1Qual , 1Forb , m)-VCS. Then, for any M # C0 , adjoin a new
row (for participant x) consisting entirely of 0’s, and adjoin
a column of 0’s. Similarly, for any M$ # C1 , adjoin a new row
(for participant x) consisting entirely of 1’s, and a column
of 0’s, except that the entry in row x and column m+1
is a 1. K
As with the previous lemma, Lemma 5.2 can be iterated.
5.2. Non-Connected Access Structures
An access structure (1Qual , 1Forb) on a set of participants
P is said to be connected if there is no partition of P into
two non-empty sets P$ and P" such that 10 2P$ _ 2P".
The next technical lemma will be used in the construction of
VCSs for non-connected access structures, given VCSs for
its connected parts.
Lemma 5.3. Let (1Qual , 1Forb) be an access structure.
Let C0 and C1 be the matrices in a (1Qual , 1Forb , m)-VCS and
let D be any n_p boolean matrix. The collections of matrices
C$0=[M b D: M # C0] and C$1=[M b D: M # C1] comprise a
(1Qual , 1Forb, m+p)-VCS.
Proof. Since we concatenate the same matrix D to any
M # C0 _ C1 , Properties 1 and 2 of Definition 2.1 are satis-
fied. Moreover, the frequencies of matrices associated with
forbidden sets and the set of thresholds [(X, tX)]X # 1Qual do
not change in going from C0 and C1 to C$0 and C$1 . Only
the relative difference :$(m$) changes, becoming :$(m$)=
(:(m) } m)(m+t). K
The next example will help in illustrating the technique
employed in the previous lemma.
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Example 5.4. The following collections C0 and C1
represent a (2, 2)-threshold VCS with m=2:
C0={_1010& , _
01
01&= C1={_
10
01& , _
01
10&= .
Setting D=[ 11] we get C$0 and C$1 constitute a 2 out of 2
threshold VCS with m=3.
Let (1 $Qual , 1 $Forb) and (1"Qual , 1"Forb) be two access struc-
tures on disjoint sets of participants P$ and P", respectively.
Define the sum of the two access structures on the set of
participants P$ _ P" to be (1Qual , 1Forb), where
1Qual=1 $Qual _ 1"Qual
and
1Forb=[X _ Y: X # 1 $Forb , Y # 1"Forb].
If an access structure is not connected, then we can realize
a VCS for it simply by constructing VCS for its connected
parts and then by putting together the schemes in a suitable
way, as shown in the next theorem.
Theorem 5.5. Let (1 $Qual , 1 $Forb) and (1"Qual , 1"Forb) be
two access structures on disjoint sets of participants P$ and
P", respectively, and let (1Qual , 1Forb) be their sum. If there
exist a (1$Qual , 1$Forb , m$)-VCS and a (1"Qual , 1"Forb , m")-
VCS, then there is a (1Qual , 1Forb , m)-VCS, where m=
max[m$, m"].
Proof. Let C$0 , C$1 and C"0 , C"1 be the collections of
matrices in the VCSs for access structures (1 $Qual , 1 $Forb)
and (1"Qual , 1"Forb), respectively. Without loss of generality,
suppose that |C$0 |=|C$1 |=r$, |C"0 |=|C"1 |=r" and m$>m".
From Lemma 5.3 there exists a (1"Qual , 1"Forb, m$)-VCS.
Let C0$$$ and C1$$$ be the collections of matrices in this
(1"Qual , 1"Forb, m$)-VCS. The collections of matrices C0 and
C1 of a VCS for the access structure (1Qual , 1Forb) are con-
structed as follows:
C0=[M: M[P$] # C$0 , M[P"] # C0$$$] and
C1=[M: M[P$] # C$1 , M[P"] # C1$$$].
Notice that |C0 |=|C1 |=r=r$ } r" as from any matrix T in
C$0 (resp. C$1) we get r" matrices to insert in C0 (resp. C1) by
‘‘padding’’ T with all the matrices in C0$$$ (resp. C1$$$) one at a
time. It is immediate to verify that Property 1 of Defini-
tion 2.1 is satisfied. Let us verify Property 2 of Definition 2.1.
Let X # 1 $Forb (X # 1"Forb , resp.) and let M # C$0 _ C$1
(M # C0$$$ _ C1$$$, resp.). By ’iX (+
i
X , resp.), where i # [0, 1], we
denote the number of times that the matrix M[X] appears
in the collection [A[X]: A # C$i] ([A[X]: A # Ci$$$], resp.).
From Property 2 of Definition 2.1 we have that ’0X=’
1
X and
+0X=+
1
X . Finally, for M # C0 _ C1 , let #
i
X , where i # [0, 1],
denote the number of times that the matrix M[X] appears
in the collection [A[X]: A # Ci]. Recall that |C0 |=|C1 |=
r=r$ } r$$. To prove that Property 2 of Definition 2.1 is
satisfied we have to show that for any X # 1Forb it holds that
#0X=#
1
X . Let X # 1Forb. If XP$"P" (the case XP""P$ is
analogous), then
#0X=’
0
X } r"=’
1
X } r"=#
1
X .
If X=Y _ Z where Y # 1 $Forb and Z # 1"Forb , then
#0X=’
0
Y } +
0
Z=’
1
Y } +
1
Z=#
1
X .
Hence the theorem follows. K
The next example will help in illustrating the technique
employed in the previous theorem.
Example 5.6. Suppose that (1$Qual , 1$Forb) is a (2, 2)-
threshold access structure on participant set P$=[1, 2],
and (1"Qual , 1"Forb) is a (2, 2)-threshold access structure on
participant set P$=[3, 4]. The sum of these two access
structures is (1Qual , 1Forb), where
1Qual=[[1, 2], [3, 4]]
and
1Forb=[[1], [2], [3], [4], [1, 3], [1, 4], [2, 3], [2, 4]].
A VCS for the access structure (1Qual , 1Forb) is obtained by
considering the following collections C0 and C1 :
C0={_
10
10
10
10& , _
01
01
01
01& , _
10
10
01
01& , _
01
01
10
10&=
C1={_
10
01
10
01& , _
01
10
10
01& , _
10
01
01
10& , _
01
10
01
10&= .
The access structure (1Qual , 1Forb) has 10=1Qual . It is
interesting to observe that the VCS constructed above is not
a VCS for the strong access structure where 1Qual is the
closure of 10 , and by a result that we prove later (Theorem
5.12), it can be shown that there is no VCS with m=2 for
the strong access structure having basis 10 . It can also be
shown that there is no VCS with m=2 constructed from
basis matrices with m=2, for the access structure
(1Qual , 1Forb).
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5.3. Unavoidable Patterns
Let M be a matrix in the collection C0 _ C1 of a
(1Qual , 1Forb , m)-VCS on a set of participants P. Recall
that, for XP, MX denotes the m-vector obtained con-
sidering the or of the rows corresponding to participants in
X; whereas M[X] denotes the |X |_m matrix obtained
from M by considering only the rows corresponding to
participants in X.
Lemma 5.7. Let (1Qual , 1Forb) be an access structure on
a set of participants P. Let X, YP be two non-empty sub-
sets of participants, such that X & Y=<, X # 1Forb , and
X _ Y # 1Qual . Then in any (1Qual , 1Forb , m)-VCS, for any
matrix M # C1 it holds that
w(MXY )&w(MX ):(m) } m.
Proof. Let M be any matrix in C1 . From Property 1 of
Definition 2.1 we have that w(MXY)tXY . Since X # 1Forb ,
then from Property 2 of Definition 2.1, there is at least one
matrix M$ # C0 such that M[X]=M$[X]. Therefore, we
have
w(MX)=w(M$X)
w(M$XY)
tXY&:(m) } m
w(MXY)&:(m) } m,
where the second inequality of the above expression derives
from Property 1 of Definition 2.1. Thus, the lemma is
proved. K
The matrices in C0 _ C1 have to contain some predefined
patterns which we call unavoidable patterns. For instance,
suppose X # 1Qual and X"[i] # 1Forb . Then for any M # C1 ,
the matrix M[X] contains at least :(m) } m columns with
a 1 in the i th row and 0’s in the other rows. This is an
immediate consequence of Lemma 5.7. Indeed, by consider-
ing X=Y _ [i] we get
w(MY _ [i])&w(MY):(m) } m.
Therefore, there must be at least :(m) } m columns in M[X]
with a 1 in row i and 0’s in the other rows.
The next corollaries are immediate consequences of the
existence of unavoidable patterns.
Recall that a participant i is an essential participant if
there exists a set XP such that X _ [i] # 1Qual but
X  1Qual . We say that i is a strongly essential participant if
there exists a set XP such that X _ [i] # 1Qual and
X # 1Forb .
Corollary 5.8. Let (1Qual , 1Forb) be an access struc-
ture on a set of participants P. Suppose that i is a strongly
essential participant, and suppose that [i] # 1Forb . Then in
any (1Qual , 1Forb , m)-VCS, for any matrix M # C0 _ C1 it
holds that
w(Mi):(m) } m.
Proof. Let X be a subset such that X _ [i] # 1Qual and
X # 1Forb . For any matrix M # C1 , because of the
unavoidable patterns (Lemma 5.7), the matrix M[X] con-
tains at least :(m) } m columns with a 1 in the i th row and
0’s in the other rows. Therefore, w(Mi):(m) } m. Since
[i] # 1Forb , the result also holds for any matrix M # C0 by
Property 2 of Definition 2.1. K
Corollary 5.9. Let (1Qual , 1Forb) be an access struc-
ture. Suppose that X # 1Qual and X"[i] # 1Forb for all
i # X. Then, in any (1Qual , 1Forb , m)-VCS, we have tX
|X | } :(m) } m.
Proof. Let i # X, and define Y=X"[i]. Let M # C0 .
From Property 1 of Definition 2.1 it results that w(MY)
w(MX)tX&:(m) } m. From Property 2 of Definition 2.1
we have that there exists at least a matrix M$ # C1 such that
w(M$Y)=w(MY). Because of the unavoidable patterns, we
have that
w(M$Y)|Y | } :(m) } m=(|X |&1) :(m) } m.
Hence, we get that tX|X | } :(m) } m. K
The next lemma states the existence of other unavoidable
patterns in any matrix in C0 _ C1 . Basically, it says that for
any Y # 1Forb and for any M # C0 _ C1 , the matrix M[Y]
contains at least :(m) } m columns whose entries are all
equal to zero.
Lemma 5.10. Let (1Qual , 1Forb) be a strong access
structure, and suppose that Y # 1Forb . Then, in any
(1Qual , 1Forb , m)-VCS, for any matrix M # C0 _ C1 it holds
that
w(MY)min[tX : Y/X, X # 1Qual ]&:(m) } m.
Proof. Because of Property 2 of Definition 2.1, we prove
the lemma only for M # C0 . Let X # 1Qual , Y/X. From
Property 1 of Definition 2.1 we get w(MX)tX&:(m) } m.
Since YX we have that w(MY)w(MX), and the result
follows. K
The next lemma shows the existence of unavoidable pat-
terns in any matrix M # C0 . It states that for any X # 1Qual
and any M # C0 , the matrix M[X] contains at least :(m) } m
columns with entries all equal to 0.
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Lemma 5.11. Let (1Qual , 1Forb) be an access structure
on a set P of participants. Suppose X # 1Qual . Then, in any
(1Qual , 1Forb , m)-VCS for any M # C0 , the matrix M[X]
has at least :(m) } m columns with entries all equal to zero.
Proof. From Property 1 of Definition 2.1, we have the
following:
w(MX)tX&:(m) } mm&:(m) } m.
Therefore, the lemma holds. K
We now look at a consequence of the unavoidable
patterns for (2, n)-threshold access structures. In a VCS
for such an access structure, the rows of any matrix
M # C1 represent a Sperner family.1 In fact, let M # C1 be an
n_m boolean matrix and let G=[g1 , ..., gm] be a ground
set. For i=1, ..., n, row i of M represents the subset
Ai=[gq: M(i, q)=1] of G. Since any two rows of M con-
tain the patterns [ 10] and [
0
1], the sets A1 , ..., An constitute
a Sperner family in the ground set G. Therefore, the rows of
the matrix M represent a Sperner family. This will be
exploited further in Theorem 6.6 and in Section 7. The
scheme given in Example 2.4 is constructed from a Sperner
family in a ground set containing four elements.
The next two theorems provide a characterization of VCS
having m=2 and of (3, 3)-threshold VCS with m=4. Both
theorems are based on the existence of unavoidable
patterns.
Theorem 5.12. Let (1Qual , 1Forb) be a strong access
structure on the set of participants P containing no isolated
participants. If there exists a (1Qual , 1Forb , 2)-VCS, then the
basis 10 is the edge-set of a complete bipartite graph.
Proof. Suppose there exists a (1Qual , 1Forb , 2)-VCS.
Then for any X # 10 it results that |X |=2. Indeed, there are
no isolated participants, and hence |X |2. On the other
hand, |X |2, since otherwise Corollary 3.5 would imply
that m4. Therefore, 10 is the edge-set of some graph G
with vertex-set P.
We first show that the graph G is connected. Indeed, sup-
pose by contradiction that there exists a (1Qual , 1Forb , 2)-
VCS and that G is not connected. Therefore, there exists a
partition of P into two non-empty sets P$ and P" such that
102P$ _ 2P". Let [i, j] # 1Qual & 2P$ and l # P". Because
of the unavoidable patterns and since the access structure
does not contain isolated participants, we have that for any
M # C1 the matrix M[[i, j, l]] is equal, up to a column per-
mutation, to one of the following two matrices:
M$[i] 10 M"[i] 10
M$=_M$[ j]&=_01& M"=_M"[ j ]&=_01& .M$[l] 01 M"[l] 10
Since the access structure is strong and w(M$[i, j, l ])=
w(M"[i, j, l])=2, from Property 1 of Definition 2.1, it result
that for any M # C0 the matrix M [X _ [l]] is equal, up to
a column permutation, to
10
_10& .10
In this case we have that w(M$[i, l ])>w(M [i, l]) and
w(M"[ j, l])>w(M [ j, l]) contradicting Property 2 of Defini-
tion 2.1, since [i, l] and [ j, l] belong to 1Forb . Therefore,
10 is the edge-set of some connected graph G.
Now, suppose that G is not a complete multipartite
graph. Then from Theorem 4.2 in [5], G contains an
induced subgraph which is isomorphic either to H or to P3 ,
where V(H)=V(P3)=[1, 2, 3, 4], E(H)=[[1, 2], [2, 3],
[3, 4], [2, 4]], and E(P3)=[[1, 2], [2, 3], [3, 4]]. First,
suppose that G is isomorphic to H. The graph H contains K3
as an induced subgraph which can represent the basis of a
(2, 3)-threshold structure. There does not exist a Sperner
family on a ground set of cardinality 2 (see [9] for details).
Hence by consideration of the unavoidable patterns and
Lemma 3.4, it must be the case that m3.
Next, we prove that if G is isomorphic to P3 , then
m3. Let 1 $Qual be the closure of 1 $0=[[1, 2], [2, 3],
[3, 4]]. Suppose by contradiction that there exists a
(1 $Qual , 1 $Forb , 2)-VCS. Let M # C1 . Since [1, 2], [2, 3],
[3, 4] # 1 $0 , because of the unavoidable patterns the matrix
M has to be equal, up to a column permutation, to
M=_
10
01
10
01& .
From Property 2 of Definition 2.1 any row of any matrix
M$ # C0 has weight 1. From Property 1 of Definition 2.1, for
any X # 1 $0 , we have that w(MX)>w(M$X). Hence, the
matrix M$ is equal, up to a column permutation, to
M$=_
10
10
10
10& .
Considering the matrices M and M$ we have that
w(M14)>w(M$14) contradicting Property 2 of Definition
2.1 since [1, 4] # 1 $Forb . Thus, there does not exist a
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(1 $Qual , 1 $Forb , 2)-VCS where 1 $Qual is the closure of 1 $0=
[[1, 2], [2, 3], [3, 4]].
Finally, suppose that G is a complete multipartite graph
having at least three parts. The graph G contains K3 as
induced subgraph, and, as above, m3.
Therefore, 10 is the edge-set of a complete bipartite
graph. K
The condition of the above theorem is necessary and suf-
ficient. We will see in Theorem 7.5 that, for any strong
access structure having as basis the edge-set of a complete
bipartite graph, there exists a visual cryptography scheme
with m=2.
By exploiting the unavoidable patterns the following
theorem proves that in any (3, 3)-threshold VCS with m=4
all matrices have a (specified) unique form up to a column
permutation. To be specific, any matrix M # C0 has as its
columns all the boolean 3-vectors having an even number of
1’s, whereas any matrix M$ # C1 has as its columns all the
boolean 3-vectors having an odd number of 1’s.
Theorem 5.13. Let (1Qual , 1Forb) be the access structure
of a (3, 3)-threshold VCS on the set of participants
P=[1, 2, 3]. In any (1Qual , 1Forb , 4)-VCS all matrices have
a unique form up to a column permutation. That is, any
matrix M # C1 and any matrix M$ # C0 is equal, up to a
column permutation, (respectively) to
1001 0110
M=_0101& M$=_0101& .0011 0011
Proof. First, let M # C1 . Because of the unavoidable
patterns we have that, up to a column permutation,
1 0 0 C
M=_0 1 0 C& ,0 0 1 C
where C denotes the presence of either a one or a zero.
Assume that the fourth entry of a row of M is zero: Without
loss of generality, suppose that M[1]=[1, 0, 0, 0].
Because of the unavoidable patterns (see Lemma 5.11), any
matrix in C0 has a column with all entries equal to zero.
From Property 2 of Definition 2.1 there exists at least a
matrix M$ # C0 such that w(M$1)=1. Therefore, the matrix
M$, up to a column permutation, looks like
0 1 0 0
M$=_0 C C C& .0 C C C
By consideration of two rows of M, it is immediate that
other unavoidable patterns of any matrix in the collection
C0 are the following columns
1 1 C C
_ 0& _C& _ 1& _ 0& .C 0 0 1
From Property 2 of Definition 2.1 and from the existence of
the unavoidable patterns, the matrix M$ has to be, up to a
column permutation,
0100
M$=_0010& .0001
The matrix M$ and Property 2 of Definition 2.1 imply that
any matrix M # C1 with w(M1)=1 is equal, up to a column
permutation, to
1000
M=_0100& ,0010
leading to a contradiction, i.e., w(M123)=w(M$123)=3.
Therefore, any matrix M # C1 does not have a row of weight
1, and it is equal, up to a column permutation, to
1001
M=_0101& .0011
Hence, any matrix M$ # C0 is equal, up to column permuta-
tion, to
0110
M$=_0101& ,0011
which proves that for any (3, 3)-threshold VCS with m=4,
any matrix M # C0 has as columns all the boolean 3-vectors
having an even number of 1’s; whereas, any matrix M$ # C1
has as columns all the boolean 3-vectors having an odd
number of 1’s. K
6. THRESHOLD SCHEMES
In this section, we study (k, n)-threshold VCS. We can
construct such schemes by using the two techniques
described in Sections 4.1 and 4.2. By using the technique
based on cumulative arrays we obtain a (k, n)-threshold
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VCS in which m=2(
n
k&1) &1 and tX=m for any set X of car-
dinality k; whereas by using the technique of Section 4.2 we
obtain a (k, n)-threshold VCS in which m=( nk) } 2
k&1 and
tX has the same value for any set X of cardinality k.
In the following section we describe a method to con-
struct threshold VCSs achieving better results.
6.1. A More Efficient Construction for Threshold Schemes
In this section we describe a construction for threshold
VCSs based on perfect hashing [8, 10, 4].
Definition 6.1. A starting matrix SM(n, l, k) is a n_l
matrix whose entries are elements of a ground set
[a1 , ..., ak], with the property that, for any subset of k rows,
there exists at least one column such that the entries in the
k given rows of that column are all distinct.
Given a matrix SM(n, l, k) we can construct a (k, n)-
threshold VCS as follows: The n_(l } 2k&1) basis matrices
S0 and S1 are constructed by replacing the symbols
a1 , ..., ak , respectively, with the 1st, ..., k th rows of the
corresponding basis matrices of the (k, k)-threshold VCS
described in Section 3. The scheme obtained is a (k, n)-
threshold VCS, as the following theorem shows.
Theorem 6.2. If there exists an SM(n, l, k), then there
exists a (k, n)-threshold VCS with m=l } 2k&1.
Proof. Let S 0k and S
1
k be basis matrices of the (k, k)-
threshold VCS described in Section 3 and let SM(n, l, k) be
a starting matrix whose entries are elements of a set
[a1 , ..., ak]. Finally, let M0 and M1 be two n_(l } 2k&1)
matrices constructed by replacing the symbols a1 , ..., ak
with the 1st, ..., k th rows of the basis matrices S 0k and S
1
k ,
respectively. In the previous construction, when we replace
the symbols a1 , ..., ak of SM with the rows of S 0k (S
1
k , resp.)
the column i of SM is expanded into an n_2k&1 matrix
referred to as the basic block B0, i (B1, i , resp.). We will show
that the matrices M0 and M1 are basis matrices of a (k, n)-
threshold VCS.
Fix any dk rows of a basic block B0, i (B1, i , resp.).
Either these rows compose all the rows of S 0k (S
1
k , resp.),
where any row of S 0k (S
1
k , resp.) can appear more than once,
and thus their ‘‘or’’ has weight 2k&1&1 (2k&1, resp.), or
they contain at most k&1 distinct rows of S 0k (S
1
k , resp.)
whose ‘‘or’’ has the same weight in both basic blocks B0, i
and B1, i . Therefore, Property 1 of Definition 2.2 is satisfied.
To prove that Property 2 of Definition 2.2 is satisfied we
have to show that for any set X[1, ..., n] of cardinality at
most k&1, M0[X] is equal to M1[X] up to a column per-
mutation. This is true since, for any i # [1, ..., l], it holds that
B0, i[X] is equal to B1, i[X] up to a column permuta-
tion. K
Example 6.3. To construct a (2, n)-threshold VCS con-
sider the matrix SM(n, Wlog nX, 2) in which the Wlog nX
entries in row i are equal to a1+b iW log n X &1 , ..., a1+bi1 , a1+b i0 ,
where the bits bij are the coefficients in the binary representa-
tion of i&1; that is,
i&1=bi0+b
i
1 2+ } } } +b
i
Wlog nX&12
W log n X &1.
The two basis matrices are constructed by substituting 01
for a1 and a2 in SM to obtain S0 and 01 and 10 for a2 in SM
to obtain S 1, respectively.
The resulting scheme has m=2 } Wlog nX which is a con-
siderable improvement compared to the scheme proposed
in [11] where m=n. However, we will provide in Section 7
an even better construction, which is in fact optimal with
respect to m.
Here are two examples to illustrate. If n=4 we obtain the
two 4_4 matrices:
S0=_
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10& S1=_
10
10
01
01
10
01
10
01& .
If n=8 we obtain the two 8_6 matrices:
S 0=
10 10 10
S1=
10 10 10
.
10 10 10 10 10 01
10 10 10 10 01 10
10 10 10 10 01 01
10 10 10 01 10 10
10 10 10 01 10 01
10 10 10 01 01 10
10 10 10 01 01 01
Example 6.4. A (3.6)-threshold VCS can be con-
structed considering the matrix SM(6, 3, 3):
SM=_
a1 a2 a3
& .
a1a3 a2
a2a1 a3
a2a3 a1
a3a1 a2
a3a2 a1
Substituting 0011, 0101, 0110 for a1 , a2 , a3 in SM to
obtain S0 and 0011, 0101, 1001 for a1 , a2 , a3 in SM to
obtain S1 we obtain the two 6_12 matrices
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S 0=_
0011 0101 0110
&
0011 0110 0101
0101 0011 0110
0101 0110 0011
0110 0011 0101
0110 0101 0011
S 1=_
0011 0101 1001
& .
0011 1001 0101
0101 0011 1001
0101 1001 0011
1001 0011 0101
1001 0101 0011
Example 6.5. A (3, 9)-threshold visual cryptography
scheme can be constructed considering the matrix
SM(9, 4, 3):
SM=
a1a1 a1 a1
.
a1a2 a3 a2
a1a3 a2 a3
a2a1 a3 a3
a2a2 a2 a1
a2a3 a1 a2
a3a1 a2 a2
a3a2 a1 a3
a3a3 a3 a1
The above 9_4 matrix SM is equivalent to the classical
affine plane of order 3, see for example [9], and is a special
case of a general construction given in [4]. This matrix is
also described by Elias in [12] in a different context. Sub-
stituting 0011, 0101, 0110 for a1 , a2 , a3 in SM to obtain S 0
and 0011, 0101, 1001 for a1 , a2 , a3 in SM to obtain S 1 we
obtain the two 9_16 matrices
S0=
0011 0011 0011 0011
0011 0101 0110 0101
0011 0110 0101 0110
0101 0011 0110 0110
0101 0101 0101 0011
0101 0110 0011 0101
0110 0011 0101 0101
0110 0101 0011 0110
0110 0110 0110 0011
S1=
0011 0011 0011 0011
.
0011 0101 1001 0101
0011 1001 0101 1001
0101 0011 1001 1001
0101 0101 0101 0011
0101 1001 0011 0101
1001 0011 0101 0101
1001 0101 0011 1001
1001 1001 1001 0011
The SM matrix is a representation of a perfect hash
family (or PHF). Fredman and Komlo s [8] proved that for
any PHF it holds that l=0(kk&1k!) log n. They also
proved the weaker but simpler bound l=0(1log k) log n.
Mehlhorn [10] proved that there exist PHFs with l=
O(kek) log n. These bounds are in general, non-constructive,
but in [4] there can be found some (constructive) recursive
constructions for PHFs with l=O((log n)log ((
k
2) +1).
Naor and Shamir [11] showed that there exist (k, n)-
threshold visual cryptography schemes with m=
2O(k log k) } log n. Our construction produces a smaller value
of m than their construction, but this has been achieved by
relaxing the condition that all thresholds tX are equal as
required in [11].
In the following we provide a lower bound on the pixel
expansion m for any (k, n)-threshold VCS. Let C0 and C1
be the collections of n_m boolean matrices of a (k, n)-
threshold VCS on the set P of n participants. Moreover,
let G=[g1 , ..., gm] be a ground set of m elements and let
M # C1 . For i=1, ..., n, row i of M represents the set
Ai=[gp : M(i, p)=1]. Because of the unavoidable pat-
terns, for any set Y=[ j1 , ..., jk][1, ..., n], the matrix
M[Y], for each row i # [1, ..., k], has at least a column with
a 1 in the i th row and 0’s in the other rows. This implies that
the sets Aj 1 , ..., Ajk are such that the union of any k&1 of
them does not contain the remaining one. Hence, any
matrix M # C1 represents a family A=[A1 , ..., An] of
subsets over the ground set G having the property that
the union of any k&1 of them does not cover any of the
remaining set (i.e., Aj13 Aj2 _ } } } _ Aj k for any distinct
j1 , ..., jk # [1, ..., n]). Such set A is called a (k&1)-cover-
free family [7] over a ground set of m elements. Therefore,
for fixed n, the pixel expansion m is lower bounded by the
size (n, k) of the smallest ground set G for which a (k&1)-
cover-free family consisting of n sets exists.
Theorem 6.6. In any (k, n)-threshold VCS the pixel
expansion is m(n, k).
In the following we derive a simple lower bound on the
value (n, k). Let A=[A1 , ..., An] be a (k&1)-cover-free
family over a ground set G=[g1 , ..., g], where =(n, k).
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Let F be a family of subsets over the ground set G con-
structed from A as follows:
F={ .
k&1
i=1
Aji : [ j1 , ..., jk&1]
/[1, ..., n] and Aj1 , ..., Ajk&1 # A= .
That is, F comprises all the unions of any k&1 sets in A.
Hence, |F |=( nk&1). It is immediate to see that F is a
Sperner family over the ground set G. It is well known (see
for example [9]) that the maximum size of a Sperner family
F in a ground set G of cardinality  is at most ( w2x); and
equality occurs if and only if F consists of all subsets of G
of cardinality w2x (or all subsets of G of cardinality
W2X). Hence, it has to be that |F |( w2x), which implies
that
\ nk&1+\

w2x+ .
Since ( w2x)2
 and ( nk&1)(n(k&1))
k&1 we have that
in any (k&1)-cover-free family =0(k log(nk)).
In [7] it has been proved a stronger asymptotic result:
A (k&1)-cover-free family CF over a ground set of m
elements exists only if
|CF |e(1+o(1)) m(k&1).
From the above arguments and because of Theorem 6.6
we get the following necessary conditions on the pixel
expansion for a (k, n) threshold VCS to exist.
Corollary 6.7. In any (k, n)-threshold VCS with pixel
expansion m, it results that
\ nk&1+\
m
wm2x+
and m=0(k log n).
7. VCS FOR GRAPH ACCESS STRUCTURES
In this section, we study access structures based on
graphs. We first recall some terminology from graph theory.
Given a graph G=(V(G ), E(G )) a vertex cover of G is a
subset of vertices AV(G ) such that every edge in E(G ) is
incident with at least one vertex in A. The complete graph Kn
is the graph on n vertices in which any two vertices are
joined by an edge. A graph G$=(V(G$), E(G$)) is a sub-
graph of a given graph G=(V(G ), E(G )) if V(G$)V(G )
and E(G$)E(G ). A clique of a graph G is any complete
subgraph of G. The complete multipartite graph Ka1 , a2 , ..., an is
FIG. 2. The graph G6
a graph on ni=1 ai vertices, in which the vertex set is parti-
tioned into subsets of size ai (1in) called parts, such
that vw is an edge if and only if v and w are in different parts.
An alternative way to characterize a complete multipartite
graph is to say that the complementary graph is a vertex-
disjoint union of cliques. Note that the complete graph Kn
can be thought of as a complete multipartite graph with n
parts of size 1.
Let P denote the set of participants, and let G be a graph
on vertex set V(G )=P, having edge set E(G). From G, we
can define a (strong) access structure 1(G)=(1(G )Qual ,
1(G)Forb) by specifying that the basis is E(G). Thus a subset
X of participants is qualified if the induced subgraph G[X]
contains at least one edge (and X is forbidden, otherwise).
As is always the case, we are interested in the minimum
value m for which such a VCS exists. We will use the nota-
tion m*(G ) to denote the value m*(1(G )Qual , 1(G)Forb) in
this section.
Example 7.1. Consider the ‘‘prism’’ graph G6 on six
vertices, depicted in Fig. 2, having edges 12, 13, 23, 14, 25,
36, 45, 46, and 56.
Define S0 and S1 as follows:
S 0=_
1 1 0
& and S 1=_
1 1 0
& .
1 1 0 1 0 1
1 1 0 0 1 1
1 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 1 0 0
Then it is straightforward to verify that S 0 and S 1 are basis
matrices of a VCS for the strong access structure 1(G6).
Hence, m*(G6)3.
In the case where G=Kn (a complete graph), we are talk-
ing about (2, n)-threshold VCS. By Theorem 6.6 and
Corollary 6.7, a (1(Kn), m)-VCS implies the existence of a
Sperner family of size n over a ground set of size m, and
hence n( mwm2x). A converse result is also true, as we now
show.
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Theorem 7.2. Suppose that the sets B1 , ..., Bn form a
Sperner family in a ground set G=[g1 , ..., gm] of cardinality
m. Then m*(Kn)m.
Proof. We define basis matrices for a VCS with strong
access structure 1(Kn). For 1in and 1 jm, define
S0(i, j )={10
if 1 j|Bi |
if |Bi |+1 jm
.
Also, for 1in and 1 jm, define
S1(i, j )={10
if gj # Bi
if gj  Bi .
It is easy to see that we obtain the desired VCS by this con-
struction. K
Next theorem holds.
Theorem 7.3. The value m*(Kn) is the smallest integer m
such that n( mwm2x).
Thus m*(K2)=2; m*(K3)=3; m*(Kn)=4 for n=4, 5, 6;
m*(Kn)=5 for n=7, 8, 9, 10; etc.
Theorem 7.3 proves a lower bound on the value of
m*(Kn) which is met with equality when the VCS for 1 is
constructed from a Sperner family in a ground set of m
elements. In such a scheme we have :(m)=1m. In [2] the
authors propose k out of n visual cryptography schemes
achieving a greater relative difference. In the case of 2 out of
n visual cryptography schemes the scheme given in [2]
achieves the best possible value for the relative difference.
Let |(G ) denote the maximum size of a clique in a graph
G. The following result is an immediate consequence of
Lemma 3.4 and Corollary 6.7.
Theorem 7.4. Let G be a graph. Then there exists a
(1(G ), m)-VCS only if |(G )( mwm2x).
Recall the graph G6 considered in Example 7.1. It is easy
to see that |(G6)=3, and thus it follows that m*(G6)=3.
A modification of Theorem 7.3, using the well-known
‘‘splitting technique’’ from secret sharing schemes [6],
together with Theorem 7.4, can be used to prove the follow-
ing result for complete multipartite graphs.
Theorem 7.5. There exists a (Ka 1 , ..., an , m)-VCS if and
only if n( mwm2x).
Proof. Let S 0 and S 1 be the basis matrices for a
(1(Kn), m)-VCS, where n( mwm2x). Then for every q,
1qn, replicate row q of S0 and S1 aq times. The result
is a (1(Ka 1 , ..., an), m)-VCS.
Conversely, suppose that a (1(Ka 1 , ..., an), m)-VCS exists.
It is easy to see that |(Ka1 , ..., a n)=n. Therefore it follows
from Theorem 7.4 that n( mwm2x). K
For a graph G, let ;(G ) denote the minimum cardinality
of a vertex cover of G. Given a graph G on vertex set P, for
any x # P, define
Inc(x)=[ y # P: xy # E(G )].
Inc(x) represents the set of all vertices adjacent to x. For
any participant x # P, let Gx=(Vx , Ex) be the subgraph of
G where
Vx=[x] _ Inc(x)
and
Ex=[xy # E(G )].
We will refer to Gx as the star graph with centre x.
Exploiting the construction used in Theorem 4.4, we can
prove the following theorem.
Theorem 7.6. For any graph G, we have that m*(G)
2;(G ).
Proof. Let XP be a vertex cover of G having car-
dinality ;(G ). For each x # X, there exists a (1(Gx), 2)-VCS
by Theorem 7.5.
Note that x # X Ex=E(G ), where ExE(G) for all
x # X. Hence, if we apply Corollary 4.5, we obtain a
(1(G ), 2;(G ))-VCS. K
If G is bipartite, with bipartition (V1 , V2), we get the
following corollary.
Corollary 7.7. Suppose G is a bipartite graph having
bipartition (V1 , V2). Then m*(G)2_min[ |V1 |, |V2 |].
Proof. V1 and V2 are both vertex covers of G, so
;(G )min[ |V1 |, |V2 |]. Apply Theorem 7.6. K
8. A DECOMPOSITION CONSTRUCTION TO ACHIEVE
HIGHER CONTRAST
Given an access structure (1Qual , 1Forb), consider a
(1Qual , 1Forb, m)-VCS having contrast 1, that is constructed
using basis matrices S0 and S 1. To construct a VCS
for (1Qual , 1Forb) having higher contrast c>1, we could
simply concatenate c copies of S0 and S 1 to get a
(1Qual , 1Forb , m } c)-VCS with contrast c. In this section we
describe a general technique for constructing VCS having
any higher contrast, which provides better schemes with
respect to the value of m. This technique was introduced by
Stinson [14] in the context of secret sharing schemes and it
is referred to as a (#, *)-decomposition.
For the rest of this section, we confine our attention to
strong access structures. Let (1Qual , 1Forb) be a strong
access structure having basis 10 and let *, #1 be integers.
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A (#, *)-decomposition of 10 consists of a collection
[1 1, ..., 1 #] such that the following properties are satisfied:
1. 1 q10 for 1q#
2. *10#q=1 1
q (i.e., the multiset union of the 1 q ’s
contains every basis subset at least * times).
The following theorem holds.
Theorem 8.1. Let 10 be the basis of a strong access
structure (1Qual , 1Forb). Let [1 1, ..., 1#] be a (#, *)-decom-
position of 10 . For 1i#, let (1 iQual , 1
i
Forb) be the access
structure having basis 1i. Suppose, for i=1, ..., #, that there
is a (1Qual , 1Forb , m)-VCS, constructed from basis matrices,
having contrast at least *, where m=#i=1 mi .
Proof. The construction used in the proof of this
theorem is similar to the one employed in Theorem 4.4. For
i=1, ..., #, let S0, i and S1, i be the basis matrices of a VCS for
the access structure (1 iQual , 1
i
Forb). From S
0, i and S 1, i we
construct a pair of matrices, (S 0, i, S 1, i), consisting of n
rows. Let us show how to construct S 0, i. For j=1, ..., n, the
jth row of S 0, i has all zeroes as entries if the participant j is
not an essential participant of (1 iQual , 1
i
Forb); otherwise, it is
the row of S0, i corresponding to participant j. The matrix
S 1, i is constructed similarly. Finally, the matrices S0 and S 1
for (1Qual , 1Forb) will be realized by concatenating the
matrices S 0, 1, ..., S 0, # and the matrices S 1, 1, ..., S 1, #, respec-
tively (i.e., S0=S 0, 1 b } } } b S 0, # and S1=S 1, 1 b } } } b S 1, #).
Let m=#i=1 mi . For i=1, ..., #, let [(X, t
i
X)]X # 1 i0 be the
set of thresholds satisfying Definition 2.1 for the access
structure (1 iQual , 1
i
Forb), and let :i (mi) be the relative dif-
ference of this VCS. Define :(m) to be
:(m)=
*
m
} min
1i#
[:i (mi) } mi]. (2)
We have to show that the matrices S0 and S 1, constructed
using the previously described technique, are basis matrices
of a VCS for the access structure (1Qual , 1Forb), having con-
trast at least *.
Let X # 10 be a set of participants. Let Y[1, ..., #] be
the set of maximum cardinality such that X #  i # Y 1 i0 .
Since [1 1, ..., 1 #] is a (#, *)-decomposition of 10 , we have
that |Y |*. Let W=[1, ..., #]"Y and define
tX= :
i # Y
tiX+ :
i # W
w(S 0, iX ).
It results that
w(S 0X)=w(S
0, 1
X b } } } b S
0, #
X )
= :
i # Y
w(S 0, iX )+ :
i # W
w(S 0, iX )
= :
i # Y
w(S 0, iX )+ :
i # W
w(S 0, iX )
 :
i # Y
(tiX&:i (mi) } mi)+ :
i # W
w(S 0, iX )
 :
i # Y
tiX&* } min
i # Y
[:i (mi) } mi]+ :
i # W
w(S 0, iX )
tX&:(m) } m,
whereas
w(S 1X)=w(S
1, 1
X b } } } b S
1, #
X )
= :
i # Y
w(S 1, iX )+ :
i # W
w(S 1, iX )
= :
i # Y
w(S 1, iX )+ :
i # W
w(S 1, iX )
 :
i # Y
tiX+ :
i # W
w(S 0, iX )
=tX .
Hence, Property 1 of Definition 2.2 is satisfied.
Now, suppose that X  #i=1 1
i. We have to show that
S0[X]=S 1[X] up to a column permutation. For i=
1, ..., #, up to a column permutation, we have that
S 0, i[X]=S 1, i[X]. Hence, it results that
S0[X]=S 0, 1[X] b } } } b S 0, #[X]
=S 1, 1[X] b } } } b S 1, #[X]=S 1[X],
where the second equality is satisfied up to a column per-
mutation. Hence, Property 2 of Definition 2.2 is satisfied,
too. From (2) it follows that the resulting scheme has
contrast :(m) } m at least *. K
Let G be a graph on vertex set P of cardinality n, and
define the access structure 1(G ) as in Section 7. Recall also
from Section 7 that Gx is defined to be the star graph with
centre x, for x # P. It is not difficult to see that [Gx : x # P]
is an (n, 2)-decomposition of G. Applying Theorem 8.1, we
obtain a visual cryptography scheme for 1(G ) having con-
trast 2, with m=2n and :(m)=1n. The next theorem holds.
Theorem 8.2. Let G be a graph on a set of n vertices.
Then there exists a (1(G ), 2n)-VCS with contrast equal to 2.
The previous theorem gives a (1(G ), 2n)-VCS with con-
trast 2. Using two copies of the VCS constructed in
Theorem 7.6 we would get a (1(G ), 4;(G ))-VCS with con-
trast 2, where ;(G ) is the size of the minimum vertex cover
of G. Therefore, for ;(G)>n2 the (n, 2)-decomposition
provides a VCS with shorter shares.
Example 8.3. To demonstrate the techniques presented
in Theorems 4.4 and 8.1, consider the access structure
1 (Cn), where Cn is a cycle on n vertices, and n5. From
Theorem 7.6, there is a (1(Cn), 4 Wn2X)-VCS with
contrast 2.
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On the other hand, from Theorem 8.2 there exists a
(1(Cn), 2n)-VCS with contrast two. Therefore, for odd
values of n5, the decomposition construction produces a
VCS with contrast 2 with shorter length of shares.
9. VCS FOR STRONG ACCESS STRUCTURES ON AT
MOST FOUR PARTICIPANTS
In this section we give upper and lower bounds on the
minimum value m*(1Qual , 1Forb) for all strong access struc-
tures on at most four participants. We consider only con-
nected access structures without isolated participants. The
bounds on m* are summarized in Table 1.
The results are obtained as follows:
v Access structures 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 9, and 10 represent com-
plete multipartite graphs and the optimal value of m* is
determined by Theorem 7.5.
v The optimal value of m* for access structures 4 and 18
is determined by Lemma 3.1 and Theorem 3.3.
v Since access structure 8 is an induced subgraph of the
graph G6 , The upper bound m*3 can be obtained from
Example 7.1 by applying Lemma 3.4.
v For the all the remaining access structures the upper
bounds on m* are obtained using the basis matrices given in
Table 2. For all the above schemes, we have :(m) } m=1.
v The lower bound m*3 for the access structures 5
and 8 is determined by Lemma 5.12.
v The lower bound m*4 for the access structures 11,
13, and 14 comes from Corollary 3.5.
TABLE 1
VCS for Strong Access Structures on at Most Four Participants
Access structure n Basis subsets m*
1 2 12 m*=2
2 3 12, 23 m*=2
3 3 12, 13, 23 m*=3
4 3 123 m*=4
5 4 12, 23, 34 m*=3
6 4 12, 13, 14 m*=2
7 4 12, 14, 23, 34 m*=2
8 4 12, 23, 24, 34 m*=3
9 4 12, 13, 14, 23, 24 m*=3
10 4 12, 13, 14, 23, 24, 34 m*=4
11 4 123, 14 m*=4
12 4 123, 14, 34 m*=5
13 4 134, 122, 23, 24 m*=4
14 4 123, 124 m*=4
15 4 124, 134, 23 m*=5
16 4 123, 124, 134 5m*6
17 4 123, 124, 134, 234 5m*6
18 4 1234 m*=8
TABLE 2
Basis Matrices for VCS for Strong Access Structures on at
Most Four Participants
access structure S0 S1
*5 _
100
110
110
010& _
100
011
110
001&
*11 _
0011
0101
0110
0011& _
0011
0101
1001
1100&
*12 _
01100
11000
10100
00100& _
10001
11000
10100
00010&
*13 _
0011
0111
0101
0110& _
0011
1110
0101
1001&
*14 _
0011
0101
0110
0110& _
0011
0101
1001
1001&
*15 _
01100
10100
10100
11000& _
10001
10010
10100
11000&
*16 _
000111
110101
110011
110110& _
111000
110101
110011
110110&
*17 _
000111
001011
001101
001110& _
111000
110100
110010
110001&
v The lower bound m*5 for the access structure 12
comes from Theorem 9.2 (see below).
v The lower bound m*5 for the access structures 15,
16, and 17 comes from Theorem 9.1 (see below).
Theorem 9.1. Let (1Qual , 1Forb) be a strong access
structure on participant set P=[1, 2, 3, 4] such that
[1, 2, 4], [1, 3, 4] # 10 . If there exists a (1Qual , 1Forb , 4)-
VCS, then there is no X # 10 such that [2, 3]X.
Proof. From Lemma 3.4 any (1Qual , 1Forb , 4)-VCS con-
tains (induced) a VCS for the strong access structures 1 $
and 1" having basis 1$0=[[1, 2, 4]] and 1"0=[[1, 3, 4]],
respectively. Therefore, from Theorem 5.13 any matrix
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M # C1 and any matrix M$ # C0 are equal, up to a column
permutation, respectively, to
M=_
1001
0101
0101
0011& M$=_
0110
0101
0101
0011& .
If this is the case, then, for any M # C1 the matrix M[23]
does not contain the columns [ 10] and [
0
1]. Because of
the unavoidable patterns, there is no X # 10 such that
[2, 3]X. Thus, the theorem holds. K
The next theorem proves that for the strong access struc-
ture 12, a VCS with m=4 does not exist.
Theorem 9.2. Let (1Qual , 1Forb) be the strong access
structure on participant set P=[1, 2, 3, 4] having basis
10=[123, 14, 34]. Then there is no (1Qual , 1Forb , 4)-VCS.
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that there exists a
(1Qual , 1Forb , 4)-VCS. From Lemma 3.4 and Theorem 5.13
any matrix M # C1 and any matrix M$ # C0 are equal, up to
a column permutation, respectively, to
M=_
1
0
0
C
0
1
0
C
0
0
1
C
1
1
1
C& M$=_
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
C
1
0
1
C
0
1
1
C& ,
where C denotes the presence of either a one or a zero.
Notice that for any matrix M$ # C0 it holds that
w(M$124)=w(M$234)=3. Since the scheme is for the strong
access structure having basis 10 , for any matrix M # C1 , we
must have w(M124)=w(M234)=4. Hence, any matrix
M # C1 is equal, up to a column permutation to
M=_
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
C
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
C& .
For any matrix M # C1 we have that w(M24)=4. Since
24 # 1Forb is has to be w(M$24)=4 for at least one matrix
M$ # C0 . This is a contradiction since for any M$ # C0 it
holds that w(M$24)3. Therefore, the theorem holds. K
In [2] it is proved that m*=6 for the access structures 16
and 17.
10. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have analyzed visual cryptography
schemes. We have extended the Naor and Shamir’s model to
general access structures and we have proposed two techni-
ques to construct visual cryptography schemes for general
access structures. We proved lower bounds on the size of the
shares distributed to the participants in the scheme. We
provided a novel technique to realize k out of n threshold
visual cryptography schemes. Our construction for k out of
n visual cryptography schemes is better with respect to pixel
expansion than the one proposed in [11] and for the case
of 2 out of n is the best possible. Finally, we considered
graph-based access structures giving both lower and upper
bounds on the size of the shares.
APPENDIX
Example of a Visual Cryptography Scheme
In this appendix an example of the secret image, the
shares corresponding to single participants, and few groups
of participants are depicted. The family of qualified sets is
1Qual=[[1, 2], [2, 3], [3, 4], [1, 2, 3], [1, 2, 4],
[1, 3, 4], [2, 3, 4], [1, 2, 3, 4]].
All remaining subsets of participants are forbidden.
The visual cryptography scheme used for this example is
described in Table 2 of Section 9.
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